Between Social Constructivism, Essentialism, No Aesthetic Principles, Moralism, Intentionalism, etc. it is difficult for the novice, such as me, to develop a critical position on these theories. If, in fact, the article by Alan Goldman is true and we can only use “evaluation” by “qualified observers,” (Goldman, 2006, p. 300) then it is a leap of faith for me, insomuch as I am swimming nearly blind through the article, to venture to say, then, that Chomsky is also correct. Correct in that Goldman (2006) explains the “middle-level evaluation contains certain properties, such as: balanced, powerful, elegant, strident, numbing, or whining, and appeal… in turn justifies overall evaluation” (p.300).
And yet Chomsky supports the concepts of “innate capacity” and “innate ideas,” but argues that creativity is in fact “illumination by evidence” (Rajchman, 2006, p. 11). The non-essentialism presented by Chomsky in his debate with Foucault is not the same as that presented by Leddy. Leddy’s use is of “essentialist claim.” He states, “… the capacity to make essentialist claims is important for such practices as teaching art…as well as teaching aesthetics” (Leddy, 1992, p. 33).
While the bulk of Leddy’s article dealt with disagreeing with Benjamin Tilghman, the nuggets of knowledge concerning aesthetics is that there are particular elements necessary for art to be considered art; the same would apply to any other form of aesthetic expression, including poetry. Leddy’s definition of essence is that something has an ‘inner nature,’ ‘a soul’ which is “the source of its intrinsic value and the key to future creative activity” (Leddy, 1992, p. 39). He goes on to say, which I find key, “…an essentialist analysis of ‘essence’ itself… the search for essence…need not be disconnected from or unrelated to search for necessary and sufficient conditions for identification or evaluation of works of art” (p. 39). I gather from this statement that in order for a poem to be a poem it must contain certain elements. While all poems do not look, sound, or read alike there still must be some essential features, within each, in order to be included in the world of poetry.
If my attempt to weave a web of understanding is correct thus far, then how can I allow room in my database for Foucault’s description of the deterministic argument? Foucault states, “An open-ended and limitless capacity for self-invention that has been suppressed and constrained in the search for order that is the most striking characteristic of modernity” (Wilkin, 1999, p. 182). Somehow this theory must be able to co-exist, in some form, because I concur with Foucault on the grounds that Early states, “The humanities…see themselves either as cultural gatecrashers and agents of radical social change or cultural gatekeepers and champions of tradition” (Early, 2009, p. 52) I, myself, have felt this “gatecrasher” state of being when I entered into the larger poetry community. The equilibrium seemed upset by the addition of a new, strange voice. I would not be swept aside by the gatekeepers and when I rose up in status I became an innovator instead of a usurper. Maybe I have to be thankful for the fact that, “These scholars’ quest to make the humanities less ‘elitist’ and more democratic and accessible to all…” (p.55) This shift, along with the concept of “public scholarship,” might be cause for alarm by the “gatekeepers” that there is now more “merit measuring” (p. 55). There is also another concern by the old guard that as the humanities moves more toward “public scholarship” “…including readings, discussions, project-based work, and site visits” (Woodward, 2009, p. 111) that there will be a “dummying down” of the arts. Through my poetry organization, The North Sea Poetry Scene, I have collaborated with the Survivors Art Foundation on projects with “Outsider Artists.” My poets would be matched up with an artist to create poems. Most of my poets were considered “outsiders” as well, in that they were not recognized by the “elite” poets.
This leads me into my next area of positioning: Moralism. In Eileen John states, “…judging art as art and judging it on moral grounds … as a means to good” (John, 2006, p. 331). I tend to agree most with John, as she makes the case for art, including poetry, which may in fact answer “no” to the question she poses when she writes, “Generally, does the moral significance of works of art systematically add to or detract from their value of art?” (p. 331).
I find the following most helpful to form my “no” answer, “…art can be artistically valuable in virtue of morally flawed content” (p.332) as it gives me hope for some of my poems that some tend to be of this nature. I create pro tanto pieces, in which “a morally flawed work
may still be very good, but its moral flaw counts to that extent against its value.” (p. 333). All this leads me to Nathan’s insights on “meaning.” He states, “Meaning, then, is the produce of coming to understanding a work, where understanding encompasses a full range of kinds of awareness of the artistically pertinent properties of the work in question (Nathan, 2006, p. 282). But where I find Nathan most informative in developing a critical position is when he says: …either the artist’s intentions are successfully embodied in the work or they are not. If they are, then any external reference to the artist’s life will add nothing. If they are not, then the artist has failed and such external information can only succeed in taking us away from the work itself into irrelevancies. (p. 283) I give the following as an example:
Spoons
I remember when you spoon-fed me ice-cream as we lay in bed on that rainy afternoon and the way your fingers tasted and your neck had a hint of sweat and I closed my eyes and you drove away the dark with your hips and I called your name in a low, soft moan.
I remember when you spooned sugar into your morning tea on that sunny Tuesday and I watched you drink as if you were a foreign film I could not understand and your smile told me my poetry made you hunger for more than a nine-to-five life.
I remember when you spooned dirt into the flowerpot and filled it with mums for me and I was peeking out the window seeing you bent down working away humming and I decided then that I was not who I wanted to be without you in my days and nights.
And I remember how after you left I packed away all the silverware, including those spoons and I gave the box to the Salvation Army, hoping for some salvation of my own and I drove away from our town knowing I would never see another sunset like you.
If I had to preface the poem then its meaning would not be as powerful. I was, in fact, with friends waiting for coffee and cake at a restaurant and we were handed our spoons and then left to wait for some time. I suggested we should all write spoon poems, as the group of us were poets. I do not deny that there must be a small tidbit of the poet in their poems; the “I” does not necessarily need to be the person within the confessional poem. Nathan’s intentionalism position is one I also agree with and find him to be the most instructive for me, as a poet.
Works Cited
John, Eileen (2005). Artistic Value and Opportunistic Moralism. In Mathew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 332--41.
Early, G. (2009). The humanities & social change. Daedalus, 52-56.
Goldman, A. H. (2006). There Are No Aesthetic Principles. In Kieran, Mathew (ed.) (2005). Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art (pp. 306-307).
Leddy, T. (1992). Theorizing about Art. Journal of Aesthetic Education, 33-46.
Nathan, D. O. (2006). Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art. In M. Kieran. Blackwell.
Rajchman, J. (2006). In The Chomsky-Foucault Debate on Human Nature (pp. 1-18). New York Press.
Wilkin, P. (1999). Chomsky and Foucault on Human Nature and Politics: An Essential Difference? Social Theory and Practice, 177-210.
Woodward, k. (2009). The future of the humanities--in the present & in public. Daedalus, 110-122.